DIALOGUE AS DEVELOPMENT *:

On Goals, Processes and Indicators of Dialogues'

by Johan Galtung Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development Project, UNU, Geneva Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, Honolulu Institute for Environment and Society, WZB, Berlin-West

1. Introduction: What Dialogues are not.

The current interest in dialogue as a new approach in social sciences arises from the usual double motivation of dissatisfaction with past and current practices, as well as expectations in connection with new ideas. In this there is the usual double danger well known from the history of science in general and social science in particular: in order to argue for a new approach alternative approaches are painted too black and the new approach too white; myths are created about past and present, and projected into the future. The following should be read with that double warning in mind.

Nevertheless there seem to be good reasons to criticize the best known alternative: the interview, particularly in the form it has been given by modern survey techniques. A very brief statement of some of the basic points in this critique might run as follows: $\frac{1}{2}$

(1) From the point of view of social structure: the entire operation of modern survey research is itself an implementation of the alpha social structure, 2/ with vertical division of labour (the interviewer mines the interviewee for data that serve as raw material for him to process), penetration (in defining questions, sometimes also precoding the answer categories, the interviewer forms the mind of the interviewee much more than vice versa), marginalization (in this structure the interviewers certainly constitute a central, first-class processing the raw data, using others as resources not participating in the processing), fragmentation (the interviewees are usually interviewed one at a time, according to a model of simple random sampling or some other model), and segmentation (the method is verbal, at a "low temperature", usually with very fixed body position and facial expression, tapping only a very

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limited segment of the person, etc.).

- (2) From the point of view of research on development itself being a model of development: as a model of development survey research can only serve as indicative of bureaucratic and corporate types of development, and as such is compatible with capitalistic (private and state) modes for economic organization and state-building approaches; not with more beta-structure inspired approaches of local autonomy, self-reliance, etc. In other words, survey research takes a socio-political stand.
- (3) From the point of view of methodological adequacy: the method is static because it is "low temperature", not permitting the interviewee to develop himself/herself during the process, and as such only able to mirror the state of mind at a low level of consciousness, not with the potential increase in level of consciousness that comes about through a real dialogue not to mention through dialogues that include action participation in concrete developmental practice. Moreover, the tendency to concentrate on one interviewee at a time tends to atomize through over-individualization the image given of social reality. 3/
- (4) From the point of view of the interviewer: the survey research gives data, but not experience. It does not offer opportunities for the interviewer to enrich himself/herself either, through participation in an active dialogue, but presupposes that the interviewer has a relatively fixed frame of reference from which the "responses" can be understood.
- (5) From the point of view of sampling: although this is not inherent in the survey method, and certainly not in the interview as such, the method is compatible with the interest of administrators of large-size units in getting impressions about averages and ranges of attitudes in their units of concern/control. Typically the method is used by corporations (market research) and bureaucrats/politicians (public opinion studies produced for political elites), which may be to the good or to the bad, depending on the merits of the case, the structure and people

involved, and the value perspective.

The point, however, is that the method has developed as a method custom-tailored to studies of big rather than small units. If the assumption is that "degree of development" is a variable that can be used and should be used to evaluate big units, e.g., corporations or states, then the survey method may be adequate. If the assumption is that the unit of development is more at the micro-level, the individual human being or small groups; then the survey method may be much too superficial and too incapable of reflecting individuals and groups as a universe, as opposed to the nation state which commonly has been the real world counterpart of what statisticians refer to as a "universe" in connection with sampling of human beings.

Maybe one could summarize most of this by asking a question: Would you apply the interview/survey method to your own best friends/family/spouse? Would you really start a fresh day reading off a question to your spouse of the "how did you sleep last night; very well, well, fair, badly, very badly" variety? If not, could it be that there is built into the survey research/interview a fundamental <u>distance</u>, even disrespect to the point of contempt for other people? A method one would not use with people "at your own level", is that a method one really can use in connection with other people? And if the answer is "no" or at least "don't know "to that type of question, what kind of search would one initiate for alternative methods? What makes one believe one has a right to use it?

This simple conclusion can also be arrived at in another way, viz by asking the question: "how do you react if someone uses the method on you?" Mould you not feel that your ideas are too subtle to be captured in a conceptual net spun by a colleague? Mould you not prefer the conversation, dialogue, or even debate as a more adequate way of probing and deepening attitudes, those of yourself and others? And in saying that a pointer for the search is already given.

2. What dialogues are not.

Dissatisfaction with existing approaches is a starting point where the dialogue enters the picture. But at this point it might be useful to start with some examples of what dialogues are not.

(1) The pedagogical or "Socratic" dialogue is not a dialogue but an exercise in persuasion. As an appendix to this paper the reader will find an excerpt from Plato, more particularly from Book VII of the dialogue The Republic. The excerpt certainly belongs to the most famous passages in western philosophy, and takes the form of a "dialogue". A closer look shows that it is a parody of a dialogue, a caricature. The poor person who is uttering the sentences that are marked off in the excerpt only provides some kind of background encouragement for the narrator to go on, possibly for the reader to get a certain theatric illusion that more than one person is involved. One is never given much of an insight into the state of mind of the second person in Plato's dialogues, except that the person somehow starts with conventional wisdom and ends up with Plato's (Socrates') wisdom, "yes, Socrates, now I understand."

It runs against the idea that dialogue would be among equals, a symmetric process where the points of departure may be very different, but where no one is assumed a priori to be a source of knowledge, even wisdom, that can be poured into the other, filling a void after having washed out the debris, through a verbal exchange From this point of view, what Socrates conducted was not dialogues, but simply a gifted pedagogical exercise where the teacher poses as somebody in search of insight, but actually only uses the verbal exchange as a strategically very well planned, not only to get the message across, but also to simplant the message in others. One hears very little about what Socrates learns from the process, because he has already learnt. He is already at the end, now leading others along the same road. People trying to persuade others, to be the cause of an effect in others, will easily accept the Plato conception of dialogue. But dialogue is a two-way, not a one-way process, however cleverly masked.

- (2) The dialogue should not be confused with an interview in depth. The interview is both the same and the opposite of the Socratic "dialogue". It is the same in the sense that one person is supposed to be the holder of much more knowledge than the other, but it is different in the sense that this person does not volunteer that knowledge in a constant flow of pronouncements, but has to be stimulated through questions in order to communicate. At any rate, the type of verbal interaction is asymmetric and neither reveals any process, nor will it in general stimulate any real process. Like the Socratic "dialogue" it is essentially a way of reading offthrough time of course, since not everything can be said in one instant what is already there and for that reason does not differ very much from the interview as used in precoded survey research. This is seen particularly clearly when a person very high up is interviewed: there is no effort to challenge. And that, in turn, is one reason why inquisitive, non-respectful interviews like the ones conducted by the German magazine Der Spiegel (or those by Orlanda Fallaci! are so refreshing: dialogues, although one element they approach missing are efforts by the "interviewee" to explore further the mind of the "interviewer". It still remains asymmetric, among other reasons simply because the person to be interviewed is a public person, while the interviewer sees himself/herself as an instrument on behalf of actual and potential readers in probing the mind of the authorities.
- (3) A debate is not the same as a dialogue. Anatol Rapoport has written a very stimulating book with the interesting title Fights, Games and $\frac{7}{}$ The book explores three different styles of conflict, "debates" being the mildest way of acting out conflict. But in spite of the softness a debate is still a form of conflict. There may be symmetry, give and take, mutual exploration of positions, but the ultimate goal of the exercise is to establish some kind of zero-sum asymmetry with a "winner" and a "loser". Although debates never have been adequately codified (like duels were, for instance), $\frac{8}{}$ it is nevertheless relatively clear that one way of bringing a debate to an end is to press—the other party

into a corner where he/she is caught in a contradiction. Debates are verbal. As statements are usually either about empirical affairs, about theoretical assumptions, or about values. The contradictions can be between any two of these three types, of the same kind or of different kinds. A simple form is to try to have the other party come up with an hypothesis about reality that can then be demonstrated to be palpably untrue in the sense of being at variance with "facts". In a saxonic intellectual culture—this kind of factual contradiction will be given considerable weight; in teutonic—for for that matter also gallic, possibly Latin in general) intellectual culture more importance might be given to a contradiction between two theoretical statements.

Debates should not be seen as more than at most a part of dialogues; possibly they might be classified as "antilogues". A dialogue should have a constructive element, with persons coming together to explore a theme conjointly, to build each other up rather than to destroy each other intellectually.

However, it is evident that the dialectic of a dialogue is such that it inevitably contains destructive elements. Hence, it may more be a question of basic motivation: is the purpose to destroy an antagonist, or is it to explore an antagonism with a view to attaining higher levels of insight, If possible together with the antagonist if impossible at least not excluding the antagonist as long as it is meaningful?

(4) Dialogues should not be confused with parallel monologues. This is an obvious point. It is easily noticed in for instance Sicilian contexts where the very loud monologues are parallel even in the sense that they take place at the same time, simultaneously - but also in standard intellectual conferences where people "interact" on the basis of "I shall keep silent and pretend I am listening to your statements on the condition that you do the same for me". The cog-wheels of the two parties do not connect, they do not constitute a joint intellectual movement. There is action, not interaction, not even hostile interaction.

(5) Dialogues should not be confused with participant observation. There is a long tradition in social science of increasing validity in the observation process by decreasing the distance between observer and the In anthropology "participant observation" is based on observed. the idea of being a participant, meaning sharing conditions with the observed, up to a certain point. The question is where this point is located. It can be defined positively in terms of how far one is willing to go in sharing the conditions, negatively in terms of what is definitely excluded. The usual mistake in trying to probe this perimeter, however, is that of looking at the conditions in an asymmetric manner, only taking into account the conditions of the "natives", of the researched. This becomes a question of living among the natives, sharing their habitat including their food, their clothes, their level of material comfort or discomfort, and - of course - their language. It may also mean sharing some of the risks: the whims of nature, including disease, for quite some time. Thus, the participant observer engages in sacrifice, or what appears as sacrifice, although it is possibly quite pleasant at a deeper level $\frac{12}{}$ The sacrifice can be made conspicuous and thrown into a bargain of no minor significance to the participant observer: monopolistic rights over the data, even over the society studied. (This is "my tribe" - look at what I have gone through to study them!)

The researched share with him/her their way of life, but not the researcher with them his/her research. The mining for data is still there at a higher level of validity, traded for a lower level of reliability. The processing of the data yields—spin-offs—that will be internalized by the researcher and his/her research community. The publication will in all likelihood be beyond the grasp of the observed—conceptually, linguistically,—economically, and so on.—And, if there should be any action consequences they would probably be borne by the observed rather than by the observer, who goes on observing. In short, this is also a "hit-and-run methodology" 13/2 even if the hit lasts longer and the run is farther than is usually—the case with survey methodology. 14/2

3. Towards a positive definition of dialogues.

In the two preceding sections, two types of negative argumentation have been given for dialogues: one pointing out the shortcomings of other approaches, particularly the survey method, one defining dialogues negatively giving five of its negations; what it is not. Time has come to say more positively what dialogue is. In order to do this, the social science enterprise in general, and its approaches to people in particular has to be the backdrop against which this type of explication unfolds.

The following is then seen as the normal mode of operation of social science: $\frac{15}{}$




Figure 1. The structure of conventional social science research.

At the top of the system is the Bureaucracy-Corporation (or state-capital) concordate, supported by a pool of intelligentsia (not to be confused with intellectuals). This steering triangle is on top of complex social formations, far removed from people. It is badly in need of extensive and deep social mapping. It has the intelligentsia at its disposal; the researchers in the diagram are seen as half-way integrated into that, reporting to the pool, but occasionally also directly to B and C - to report to B often seen as being more to the left, to report to C (market research, for instance) as being more to the right. They may receive honoraria in return; wages from them and/or from academe (in turn paid by B and/or C). They mine people in different ways for data;

process the data, debate the significance among themselves, send it upwards to B and/or C, deposit it in the pool. and send a trickle downwards in return - a popular article, a speech, a "token of our gratitude for your participation." To the extent that there are action consequences these will be B and/or C initiated since they get the information directly or indirectly (via the intelligentsia), and since they are seen as legitimate actors in a B-C run society. Researchers may not be value-free, but they should at least be action-free qua researchers. Regardless of whether there are action consequences or not the findings are deposited with the pool and can be drawn upon later (under the idea of publicly available research by B, C, and/or I, or by the researchers themselves).

Social science as it became institutionalized fits the model, and not only that; it is a part of technocracy as a mode of production in "modern" society, performing its social mapping task. True, there is also the other very important aspect: social science as a contribution to truly intellectual life, questioning any unquestioned assumptions, those of the people paying wages and honoraria, including those of colleagues, and indeed, including one's own! Intellectuals may give formulations of new visions, identifying new problems and answers to them, for the public at large, for other intellectuals, e.g. in political parties, in B and C or I. But in general social science is a part of the top-to-bottom enterprise, and as such be criticized and modified. Dialogue is one approach to this modification in a family of approaches bringing together much of what has come recently in the social sciences $\frac{17}{.}$ forth

Hence, the first step in defining dialogue positively would take

Figure 1 as its point of departure and ask: what is missing?

Where can changes be made in this structure, to facilitate reflection on the structure, and further to change it through the research process itself? Bearing in mind that one aspect of development, almost

regardless of how it is defined, is to call for action against excessive top-heaviness of the society? If research in the social sciences is, at least potentially, a tool for increasing consciousness, and if development has as a condition — a more symmetric distribution of consciousness, away from an excessively top-heavy concentration, and if dialogue is seen as a way of developing this consciousness, not the least through social practice, then it should follow that there are at least three types of dialogues with subtypes:

A TYPOLOGY OF DIALOGUES

Type I: Researcher - researcher dialogue

This is a perennial aspect of any good research: the critical, soulsearching effort to question the unquestioned assumptions, kept alive in non-bureaucratized corners of academe, sometimes at some risk to those who ask questions for which there are no acceptable answers for the time being - the risk being not so much material and political (although that certainly also plays a role) as the risk of asking the questions too early so that they are ignored; the risk of loneliness, in other words.

Type II: Researcher - people dialogue

At this point the researcher reaches out beyond his own relatively closed ghetto, the academic community (which also calls for action, but usually of a rather limited kind), and out to people. What he/she does will be explored below; here it should only be mentioned that this gives rise to at least two sub-types of dialogues:

Type IIA: Dialogues researchers - elites

Type IIB: Dialogues researchers - people in general

They are different for reasons to be explored below (under "process of dialogues"). The basic point is not to limit the whole idea of dialogues to what anthropologists usually do: dialogues "down", with "natives", "villagers", with the marginalized and down-trodden one way or the other. This is terribly important, but so are dialogues with

"people high up", with B and C in the figure.

Type III: <u>People - people dialogue</u>
Again there are two types here, for our purpose:

Type IIIA: People-people dialogues with researchers present
Type IIIB: People-people dialogues with researchers absent

In the former the researchers may act as catalysts, facilitators, etc. But they would not simply sit in listening: the whole concept of dialogues does not admit for passivity and observerism. In the latter case there are no researchers, people do what people do anyhow: they simply have dialogue, as a perfectly normal form of life.

It goes without saying that one of these does not exclude the others. Rather, they may be seen as different aspect of a dialogical society, as seen from the researchers' point of view. They may also be coupled to each other in various ways. Thus, one could easily imagine a researcher-initiated cycle, starting with the researchers dialoguing among themselves about what to do with some part of the dialectic of a society that has gotten stuck. From there on dialogues with "planners/ decisionmakers", and/or with "concerned citizens" might be attempted. Or, the researchers might play a much more modest role as facilitators of the dialogues of others. What they bring into that process is clear: conceptual skills; knowledge of corresponding situations elsecomparative perspective which no doubt can where. They bring in a be used for manipulation, but also for enlightenment. The "your case reminds me of what I once read in a book/article --" etc. is one approach here. Another and perhaps more fruitful contribution would be (if it is a contemporary case) to try to bring those other people into the dialogue itself, simply serving as the medium through which a contact of that type is established. The researcher as a medium for others to dialogue is a role for which researchers are not trained, except at the micro level; client-centered therapy, sensitivity groups .18/ The researchers establish contact among groups with similar experiences and then recede into the background as dialogue unfolds.

But one could just as well or better see the dialogue process as people-initiated. As people dialogue they might call upon the social scientist as a facilitator. Or the researcher, himself/herself being part of people, simply emerges as a participant. For genuine dialogues to take place it is quite possible that the researcher who engages in dialogues with B and C will be different from the researcher who engages in dialogues with people in general: this is not only a question of different skills involved, but of different interests. In a dialogue of the researcher-people variety it is the task of the researcher to be people, in other words to shed some of his intellectual trappings and enter as one among others. When he/she is a catalyst/facilitator another role is enacted. And when he/she dialogues with other researchers still another role is invoked: that of the intellectual, among colleagues. Thus, the typology of dialogues indicated here gives a rich spectrum of form of living through research, for the researchers 19/

What does it do to social structure? It does not do away with B and/or C, but it may serve both to strengthen the people level at the bottom of Figure 1 and to make it more self-reliant. It might also serve to split the intellectual community more clearly into those working for and with B and C and those working for and with people in general - in itself an interesting development in contemporary society. The result might look something like this:




Figure 2. One alternative structure to the conventional structure.

4. Goals, processes and indicators of dialogues.

Let me now try to be more explicit about dialogue by discussing the purpose, how it is done, and how one would know whether a dialogue has been successful or not.

(1) The goals of dialogues.

The purpose of a dialogue is not to get data. It is not a new way of mining other people for information, more valid because it is at closer distance and higher temperature, more involved, more participatory. One might even go so far as the title of this essay saying that dialogues are not tools for development; dialogue $\underline{i}s$ development. It is linked to an image of the developmental process as a struggle against domination, here referred to as "verticality". That immediately gives rise to at least three relatively clear goals of dialogues: $\underline{20}$ /

- <u>consciousness-formation</u> the dialogue as a way of enhancing in others and oneself the level of consciousness about the forces (natural, social in a broad sense, mental, spiritual) conditioning one's situation; through discussion, challenge, give-and-take;
- <u>mobilization/organization</u> the dialogue as a way of proceeding from awareness to organization for action, of crystallizing a <u>set</u> of people into a <u>group</u> of people, an actor e.g. through decisions on a plan of action;
- <u>action/struggle/fight</u> the dialogue as action, as translation of consciousness and organization into concrete action, whenever possible <u>not against somebody but for something</u>, by already including the antagonist in the dialogue group.

Thus, <u>dialogue is politics</u>, it is not neutral, not above or below politics, it <u>is</u> politics. It is also action research. It is research in the broader sense of proceeding from the empirical and the critical to the constructive, meaning more particularly building new structures that are less vertical, through critical information and dialogue action.

A dialogue capable of running through this cycle could be referred to as a $\underline{\text{full-fledged}}$ dialogue; one that is limited to one or two as a $\underline{\text{truncated}}$ dialogue. The latter should not be scoffed at: to achieve a higher level consciousness through a process of mutual challenge and stimulation is no minor achievement. But the concept of dialogue should not be limited to this aspect alone. Needless to say, a dialogue may be dormant or latent for a period, then be reopened again; and the goals need not be run through in the order of their presentation here.

(2) The process of dialogues

This is not the place to go into detail as to how dialogues can be carried out, that will be done elsewhere 24/But three conditions for the process to take place can be indicated:

- there is a theme of mutual interest The dialogue is built around something that fills the participants sufficiently to be attractive. If the dialogue has a horizontal structure (see below) then there will be neither coercive, nor remunerative power to keep people in the process; the process has to be rewarding in its own right to attract and keep the participants.
- there is a minimum level of empathy The dialogue is predicated on the assumption that people are willing to listen, not only to talk; to take in others and let what they say touch them, not only to try to bring about changes in others $\frac{25}{}$ Empathy should not be confused with sympathy; it may lead to sympathy but this is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition. Thus, the dialogue concept envisaged here could also be across conflict borders, whether direct or structural conflict, with no assumption of underlying sympathy. $\frac{26}{}$
- the structure of the dialogue group is basically horizontal No one should bring into the dialogue an edge of structural or resource power that will significantly influence the dialogue as a process. There are actually two points here: the dialogue group should be horizontal and participants equal as to resources outside the

dialogue itself. The meaning of a horizontal structure will be spelt out below. The meaning of resource equality is simple: dialogue is among equals (in power, privilege, resources of any kind). If a person differs significantly in resources from others, the approach is not necessarily to try to change that person into something less privileged in resources, but for that person either not to participate in the dialogue, or to be in the process as a catalyst, facilitator only, but not really of it. (Type IIIA above)

(3) The indicators of dialogues

How do we know whether a dialogue has been successful or not? Obviously by comparing the outcome of the process with the goals, which leads immediately to three sets of indicators of a dialogue:

- at the personal level of the participants is there a change in the level of awareness, of consciousness, a deeper understanding? An ability to understand (which is not the same as to accept what others bring into the dialogue), even a readiness to accept the risk of undergoing a change in one's own conceptions of reality? An increased level of articulation, both at the pre-verbal and verbal levels?
- at the social level of the dialogue group was the group able to build a relatively horizontal structure, to practice on itself what it might preach to others? Not asking for total equality in participation, $\frac{27}{}$ were people left out for reasons other than lack of interest in the theme? Was the group able to go beyond a horizontal structure into the level of becoming an actor, sufficiently mobilized and crystallized to do something if it so decides?
- at the social level of action was the group able to carry out meaningful action, not necessarily on an environment outside the group, but also on an environment enclosed by the group? In other words, was there a product different from reports about consciousness-formation, different from group resolutions? Was a piece of development delivered as a result, not merely development on paper, or in the minds of participants? $\frac{28}{}$

5. Dialogues as an approach in social sciences.

Let us then retrace our steps in the discussion of dialogues; in some cases reformulating what has already been said to give it a new touch.

The dialogue is for the micro-level, it is operating in the small. It can be between two persons or more, but it cannot in any way compete with the survey method when it comes to including big numbers of persons in one dialogue. In order to explain positively what it is it not only can but should be posited against the survey method, using the same dimensions that were used to criticize surveys "What dialogues are not" in the first section. We start with "from the point of view social structure" - what kind of structure does the dialogue engender?

Thus, essential in the dialogue is that it is horizontal, it is between equals. The dialogue should not be between one with experience and one without. The dialogue should be structured in such a way that if the participants differ very much in terms of command of a topic then other topics should also be introduced so as to make for more balance. This raises a problem of some significance: if the same social scientist is participating in a number of dialogues about the same topic, s/he will after some time gain considerable experience. will no longer be "fresh", and the danger In a sense s/he is that the person will do one out of two: either dominate the dialogue scene completely, or draw into a role as "catalyst", "moderator", faking a modesty for which there is no objective basis. But then it may be argued that it is not so important that a social scientist participates in all dialogues: that very idea is probably a carry-over from the survey method. People in general should be, and are perfectly capable of organizing their own dialogues and could make some report about it - and the social scienthave a dialogue among themselves. To this, however, it may be objected that it would deprive the social scientist of the type of insight that derives from dialogue participation with other than peers among his colleagues and this is of course correct. Hence the point to be made is simply that although social scientists would also be participants dialogues that point should not seen as a necessary condition for a dialogue to take place.

The dialogue is <u>mutually conditioning</u>, it is an act of interdependency. What this means in practice is the following: it is not an instrument, a soft way of obtaining masses of data where the social scientist is his own instrument observing what takes place is true interaction where the social scientist himself or herself will change in the process. To increase the sensitivity in this direction one might ask of oneself to make a report about such changes, not only about what one has learned from a dialogue, but how it has changed one's views, attitudes, basic relation to the field of discourse. In other words, and that relates to the point above: there is an element of Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty involved: the social scientist ceases to be an instrument in the classical sense and becomes a part of social reality fusing with others, conditioning and being conditioned by others.

The dialogue is participatory. This is obvious as long as the discussion goes on; but the point should be carried further. Ideally, it should carry into the more analytical phase where the themes that have been expressed in the dialogue are extracted so that others can better see what the dialogue was about. This is not a task that should be left to the social scientists with their biases alone, not is it a task that should be left to an inner circle in the group. Ideally, everybody should participate in the process, perhaps making that the final part of the dialogue – a collective synthesis formation (31) – including a collective write-up.

The dialogue method is based on togetherness, as the group dialogue. Would normally be preferred to the dyadic dialogue. It is not like a survey "taking one person at a time". Basic to the approach would be to let the group as such play itself out, with or without social scientists, as participants on an equal basis. But for this to happen it is probably not enough to bring together any kind of collection of individuals. Ideal would be a group that is already concerned, e.g. in a development project, and for that reason have some minimum shared concern and also understanding of development as

a phenomenon. (33) In other words, it should be a group already constituted with some level of togetherness, not an articificial grouping of people.

The dialogue is integrative, it is not based on segmentation. The participants participate with their full personalities, as far as this is possible as long as the dialogue is verbal. No topics are taboo, the participants should be permitted to get off on tangents in various directions if they themselves feel that this is relevant. There obviously has to be a minimum of discipline, but that should be kept at a level so low that it is compatible with the "high temperature" one might hope would develop during some stages of the dialogue. Only the group can set. an agenda within the very generous framework given by the themes for discussion, and they may redefine the themes. Where the survey constitutes a very rigid agenda both in terms of topics and the order in which they should be dealt with, the dialogue is open. There is not even the orderly linear agenda dear to Western organization man, and no chairperson saying "this topic has So much from the point of view of the social structure induced by the dialogue as an approach. Proceeding along the lines of discourse in the first section, how does the dialogue relate to development itself, in terms of "itself being a model of development"?

The answer should be a positive one. The dialogue is in itself a beta-structure if it is carried out in the way indicated above; it is the very opposite of the alpha-structure of the survey research method. But the point carries further than to a simple analysis of the social structures accompanying the approaches. It becomes also a question of the very purpose and intent of the dialogue. If it should only be a softer, more penetrating way of obtaining data that could then be presented by social scientists at international conferences all it would amount to would be a utilization of beta-approaches for highly alpha-tpye purposes. Given our social and world structures

it will be hard to avoid this completely; but there is at least one factor that could tilt the approach in a more genuine developmental direction. That factor would be along the lines mentioned above: to tie the dialogue to an ongoing developmental process, some kind of project where people are engaged and involved.

That "project", incidentally, might also be in a latent, dormant stage in which case the task of the dialogue would be to serve the purpose of consciousness formation. The dialogue could be a way in which people become better agents of development, better carriers of developmental prospects; including the development of the social scientist and indirectly also social science itself. It is not a question of extracting data from people making it visible elsewhere; it is a question of jointly gaining higher level of insights for developmental purposes.

This, then, has important implications for a discussion of the methodological adequacy of the approach. There is a uniqueness to the dialogue which is not found in the survey method; the dialogue applies to the specific in any specific situation. As an approach it is probably very low on reliability.

If the same social scientists repeated the dialogue with the same group later on (assuming other factors being constant) they would definitely not get the same outcomes of the process; nor would other social scientists. In other words, the two classical criteria of intra-subjectivity and intersubjectivity would not be dimensions along which the dialogue method would rate high. One simple reason for this is the Heisenberg aspect referred to above: if the dialogue is a really good one the participants are no longer the same persons after they have been through the process, so how could they be able to replicate the process - particularly if both social scientists and the others have undergone some changes? Implicit in this is the point that a fresh social scientist participation might produce more similar results, in other words, that the intersubjectivity might be higher than the intra-subjectivity of

the approach .

However, this should not be a source of worry. Rather, one might examine why the requirement of reliability has been seen as important in the social sciences. It could be because there is a vested interest in predictability, even to the point of view of constancy. Invariant aspects of society are considered more attractive than dynamic aspects. The dialogue is dynamic, flexible and self-transcending, and should be so - hence these methodological criteria in a sense do not apply.

But there is another criterion that does apply: the criterion of validity. The assumption is that through the dialogue approach much deeper insights into basic themes that may be proposed as themes around dialogues might unfold:

- What is a good society like; what are the characteristics of a good life?
- How do we get to this society or way of life, and what stands in the way, which are the problems?
- How do we know whether we are moving in the right or wrong directions?

(It will be unterstood that these three formulations refer to goals, processes and indicators of development respectively).

The claim for a higher validity for dialogues is based on a number of factors. First, there is a dynamic, a dialectic to the discussion which serves to unearth what normally is dormant, even hidden. Second, it may serve to create attitudes and insights, the way such things are created in social reality. Third, it is a group process, not a lonely reflection. And fourth, it may be tied to a project so that the approach would be a part of an action research program, insights immediately or relatively quickly translated into practice and vice versa. To the allegation that this is politics more than research the answer would of course be that that also applies to the survey method; it is different kinds of research, and hence different kinds of politics.

From the point of view of sampling: representativity does not enter as a criterion in connection with dialogues. The point is not to define a space on which individuals and other units can be scattered, sampling from that space in such a way that a good image of the "universe" can be formed. The dialogue is a highly ideographic approach, not a nomothetic one. As an approach it is inextricably related to the uniqueness of that group in that situation; which does not mean that comparisons cannot be made. But the number of factors that vary, inherent in the approach itself, would be so many that it would be foolhardy to try to arrive at an image of, say, an administrative unit like a country. Characteristics may emerge and it may become clear that one group, in one situation in one country may be very similar to another group, in another situation in another country; thereby laying the basis for networks between such groups with similar or complementary perspectives. Such groups could get to know each other through the medium of a social science project, feeding the synthesis of one dialogue into the dialogue process of another group, and vice versa. This also operates over time: the same group might like to come back to its own dialogue of yesterday or yesteryear, reacting on it; thus making for interactions in time and space through the dialogue method. The argument is certainly that this is development relevant; it might even be argued that such interaction itself not only is a means but even a part of development. How it works out in practice, however, remains to be seen.

Then, the point of view of the social scientist. The social scientist is also entitled to development, to personal growth. One argument in favor of the dialogue approach is that it may enrich the social scientist personally, not only careerwise. Again, this stands out as an hypothesis that will have to be tested in practice, not as something that is true <u>a priori</u>. In a sense the basic aspect of a dialogue method can be expressed

in the following way: in the survey method the researcher is 100 per cent researcher and the researched 0 per cent; under the dialogue approach both the social scientist and the others will share the research and the developmental activities. The social scientist may not be a participant in the same sense as the others, but he will be concerned, motivated, take part in the discussions, offer ideas, receive criticism and so on. From being 100 per cent researcher and 0 per cent participant he may move towards 80/20, 70/30,etc.; and the others may move from being 0 per cent researchers and 100 per cent something else to profiles of the 20/80, 30/70 varieties.

Then, to try to get deeper into the exploration of dialogue as an approach let us try to make more clear how it would be different from the four examples of non-dialogues given in the second section above.

It would certainly differ from the "Socratic" by avoiding such gross asymmetries. In order to do that one might have to exclude from the dialogues extreme cases where dominance and submissiveness are concerned; or - as mentioned above - design the dialogue in such a way that it somehow comes out even in the longer run. However, these are in a sense technocratic approaches. More important is the general attitude with which one enters a dialogue. The attitude should not be one of seeing oneself as the cause, because of one's own insight, of changes to be brought about in others. It should be one of delight in entering into a process where there will be a give and take, a mutual, reciprocal learning process. On the other hand, in that process one should not hold back but honestly come forth with what is on one's mind - exactly like a dialogue between equals, particularly between friends, would be (a dialogue between non-friends might be much less frank because one might be more afraid of the social and personal outcomes in emotional terms; a friendship is a relation that can stand honesty).

Similar remarks can be made about the interview fallacy; in the experience of the present author this is perhaps a major difficulty. If the social scientist is in a new situation his curiosity will probably put him into the role of the interviewer, trying to extract information (see appendix 2 to this paper). The person on the other side may for various reasons also prefer to fall into the informant role. This should be avoided, and for that purpose some warming-up, even interview-type, sessions might be needed; setting the scene more straight and more equal as information gaps diminish. Then one can go into real dialogues.

Similarly, it is obvious that dialogue is more than debate. It should not be entered into with a purpose of "winning" the dialogue by pushing one's views across. Rather, there should be an underlying contractual relation to the effect that "we are here together for exploring something important, let us try to help each other gaining more insight, if necessary by questioning each other's views, or by building on them, constructing further, into new directions." Obviously. some cultures and civilizations are more tuned in this direction than others. Extremes, in the present author's experience, might possibly be the Japanese and the French dialogue cultures: the former systematically being built around areas of consensus with extremely carefully worded excursions into areas of dissent; the latter would be built around dissent, systematically finding areas of disagreement, and with extremely carefully worded, even subdued references to possible areas of consensus. Maybe what we are referring to as dialogue is something in-between, being afraid of either extreme, yet building the dialogue around a combination of consensus and dissent seeking approaches.

Correspondingly, dialogues will also have to get out of the parallel monologue and participant observation fallacies much the same way as just indicated. There has to be a sincere interest in what others bring into the dialogue "market", not merely as something to be beaten down and contradicted, or to listen to politely waiting for one's own turn, or to observe, not for its content and what it means to the person who brings it forth, but as indicator of deeper levels of personal and social structure only. This may be important and interesting - but it is not dialogue.

And that concludes our positive presentations, closely related to the negative presentation in the first and second sections.

6. Conclusion: On Promises and Limitations of Dialogue as an Approach.

From a methodological or rather epistemological point of view the dialogue does not belong to the class of methodologies that can be used to falsify or verify hypotheses. Rather, it belongs to another class of "insight bulding devices" (IBD); a class in which participant observation, deep empathy, intuitions and so on might also belong. Some would refer to IBD as pre-scientific, as a condition, at the most, for scientific work to emerge later, in the sense of crystallizing the insights into falsifiable hypotheses. Others might, like the present author, accept that view but add to it another view: IBD and in that connection dialogues as a scientific approach, are geared towards the unique and specific, producing raw material of which hypotheses may be formed, but also producing the type of material out of which hypotheses might be falsified. Thus, there is no reason why one cannot a priori formulate an hypothesis about how a dialogue might develop, which themes would be touched, etc., given the specificity of the situation and also a large range of experience that might place that specificity in a broader context. Whether entering the dialogue with that spirit in mind is combinable with the ethos of a dialogue or not remains to be discussed, but it should not be ruled out beforehand as impossible.

In general, it would probably be contrary to the spirit of a dialogue to try to administer, systematize and co-ordinate. A dialogue should unfold itself freely, and is closer to uncontrolled human life than to controlled laboratory experiments just as the form of reporting about the dialogue might be closer to literary prose than to conventional research presentations. It should simply be seen as another style of doing research, another mode of insight production, closely attached to social practice; and not as the style.

That last point could stand some elaboration. Both for pragmatic and theoretical reasons one might come to the conclusion that


neither a pure beta-society nor a pure alpha-society constitute an ideal background against which human self-realization, individually and collectively, may take place; hence the need to explore mixes, combinations of the two. The same may also apply to methodology: neither pure beta-methodologies nor pure alpha-methodologies should be given 100 per cent dominance over the research scene; hence the need to explore possible combinations. Incidentally, there may also be alpha-structures where the people commonly thought of as the objects of research in fact become the subjects: the type of situation where the local person stands up, points his finger at the social scientist, and says "now I'm going to tell you people something ---". The narrative interview where the social scientist does nothing but listening, may be one example of this. In a sense it is the opposite of the survey approach, with the dialogue being in between. In other words, there is a rich spectrum in the field of induced that one should look for, not merely a pendulum swing from one extreme to the other, glorifying one extreme, villifying the other.

Then the other aspect of the dialogue: consciousness-rising. Maybe be only the high temperature approaches will have this built-in potential; the others do not sufficiently engage emotions. Thus, the methods commonly found in the repertory of anthropology, careful participant observation, skillful use of informants for narrative interview, are also low temperature methods, coming out of a general epistemological orientation according to which it was considered correct not to stir up the research object in any way, It should be observed as if the observer were not present, and certainly not engage in processes disturbing to the observer. Perhaps it comes be closer to pychotherapeutic types of communication with the therapeut serving as an object of displaced aggression; with the difference that the therapeut is using himself as an object, as an "it" in an I-It-relation, the I being the patient. He is not in it, he is of it. Heat is not the same as involvement.

But when there is real involvement and a deeper understanding evolves there is little doubt that the dialogue might turn the participants into subjects in the struggle for development rather than into objects steered by development planning from above. As such the choice of method is no doubt politically relevant, and might itself become a highly contentious issue for the simple reason that methods that do not disturb the power elites will tend to be regarded as "scientific" whereas approaches that might have disturbing effect would be seen as "politicized". (46)

Let us now elaborate a little on Figure 1 and 2 from the third section: the three types of settings in which the dialogue as an approach becomes relevant in a social science project in general, and a development project in particular. This is illustrated in Fig. 3.

Figure 3: From one to three types of dialogue in a project



There is the conventional model according to which researchers (Re) extract data from the researched (Rd), and then have a discussion, maybe a dialogue among themselves about the data and how to interpret them. Methodologies concerned with validity and reliability of data extraction and data processing typically belong to this model.

This could then be compared to the figure to the right where there is still extraction and processing of data, but more aspects have been added. First, there is the idea of having two other types of dialogues, interactions between researchers and researched, and among the "researched", who then no longer are "researched" in that sense but themselves subjects in, not of, the research process. If this could even take place across national borders it would constitute something very new in the social sciences. (47)

But then there is also the idea that research is not only a problem of how researchers can understand the researched, but also how the researched can understand the researchers, "understand" being taken in the broad sense of not only cognitive understanding but "coming to grips with". For this to happen, the forms in which the researchers present their findings have to be meaningful to the researched, not only to other researchers; not only in the sense of being understood, but in the sense of being challengeable. It should be noted that social science methodology so far has been concerned only with the processes indicated in the conventional model, not with the processes added to that in what is here referred to as the GPID-model.

The GPID-model would require much more of the researchers. In addition to the conventional skills already implicit in the model there would be at least two more skills: capacity of having dialogues with others than research colleagues, calling for a high level of sensitivity, of ability to listen, of flexibility; and skills in presenting findings so as not only to communicate, but also to make oneself accountable to others than colleagues. At present we may not even know, only have intuitions about, what this may imply - much practice is needed in order to penetrate more deeply into these matters. Thus, what does it mean to the research process when the "researched" have an unalienable right to their own presentation of themselves, their own Selbstdarstellung;

at any point being able to challenge the presentation of them, often highly fragmented, segmented and marginalized, made by the social scientists? How heavy should the voice of the researched weigh against the voice of the researcher in the final presentation? Today the researched may have some control over the data production, for instance, by deciding to cheat consistently or inconsistently (the latter being by far the more destructive from the point of view of the researchers). What if tomorrow the researched also wanted control over the data processing and the data analysis, not to mention write-up and theory formation? Is it obvious that science is a game according to which such claims may always be rejected as unscientific? What would be the possible ways in which the claims might add to rather than detract from scientific insight?

A comparison might be done with newspapers: some time in history, in some places in geography it was taken for granted that readers are readers and nothing more; at other times and in other countries the readers are in fact writing the paper together with the staff, sending in solicited and unsolicited material. The "letters to the editor" column is a clever way of getting unpaid raw material that often provokes considerable interest. Sometimes it co-exists with what the professional staff does, in more or less prominent positions in the newspaper; at other times it may interact with what the staff, does, leading to heated dialogues in the paper colums - or in the wallposter presentations to mention a form of non-oral dialogue, in fact an action dialogue, that is more compatible with betacommunities than the newspaper usually is.

These problems, however, should in no sense constitute reasons for giving up such endeavours to broaden the range of methodological concerns in innovation. On the contrary, it is exactly from such challenges that innovations may be made. But for this to happen what is needed is above all more experience - more practice.

NOTES

* This paper was presented in preliminary versions at the First and Second Planning Meeting of the UNU Goals, Processes and Indications of Development Project in Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia and Geneva, Switzerland, April 1977 and January 1978 respectively, and at the first meeting of the subproject Dialogues of the GPID project Penang, Malaysia, 1-7 September 1979. It was also presented at a seminar organized at the Freie Universität, Berlin-West, June 19, 1978, and at the Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, 13 November 1979. I am indebted to discussants at all places but would like to underline the very preliminary character of the present paper - nothing but an input in the early phase of a dialogue about dialogues.

Footnotes

- 1) For a more detailed analysis of this, see Johan Galtung, "Is Peaceful Research Possible? On the Methodology of Peace Research", Essays in Peace Research, Vol. 1, Ejlers, Copenhagen, 1975, Chapter 12.
- 2) For a more detailed discussion of the difference between alpha- and beta-structures, see Johan Galtung, <u>Development</u>, <u>Environment and Technology</u>, UNCTAD, Geneva, 1978; Chapter 1, and "On Alpha and Beta and Their Many Combinations." <u>Visions of Desirable Societies</u>, <u>Eleonora Masini</u>, ed., <u>Pergamon Press</u>, 1980. (Spanish edition Mexico 1979)
- 3) For a critique of the survey method, see Johan Galtung, <u>Theories and Methods of Social Research</u>, Columbia University Press, New York, 1967, I, 6.4.
- 4) This shifting of emphasis in the definition, and consequently in the whole approach, of development is characteristic of the GPID project. The focus is on human and social development rather than on, for instance, economic development. Put differently: the macro aspects are taken out of the core of the development concept and placed more towards the periphery as instruments, means and modes and the micro aspects and indeed the human beings him/herself are placed in the core.
- 5) The metaphore of brainwashing, however, presupposes that there is something to wash out by the non-dialogical pedagogue/demagogue. The "other" in Plato's dialogues are often presented as so empty that the metaphore of brain-filling may be more adequate than that of brain-washing.
- 6) For a taste of her approach to people in power consider the following:
 - "Dr. Kissinger insinuates that I was "on to" something. True, I was "on to" hoping to find a man less arrogant and more coherent than the one portrayed in those days by the American press. I failed, and my

interview with him thus remains the worst I have ever done, the most boring in every sense" (TIME, 19 November 1979).

FALLACI: "Love or fanaticism, Imam? It seems to me that this is fanticism, and of the most dangerous kind. I mean fascist Fanaticism.

KHOMEINI: "No, it is neither fascism nor fanaticism. I repeat, they yell this because they love me, and they love me because they feel that I care for them, that I act for their good. That is, to apply the commandments of Islam" (The Washington Post, from The Guardian, 28 October 1979).

7)

- 8) See Johan Galtung, "Institutionalized Conflict Resolution", <u>Essays</u> in Peace Research, Vol. III, Copenhagen, Ejlers, 1976, pp. 434-83.
- 9) This theme is explored in Johan Galtung, "Structure, Culture and Intellectual Style: An Essay on Saxonic, Teutonic, Gallic and Nipponic Approaches", Geneva, 1979.
- 10) For an additional effort to characterize this particular intellectual style, see Johan Galtung, "Deductive Thinking and Political Practice: An Essay on Teutonic Intellectual Style", Papers on Methodology, Ejlers, Copenhagen, 1979; Chapter 8, pp. 194-209.
- 11) Thus, it should not at all be assumed that the parties to a dialogue necessarily will have to come from the same side of a conflict border whether that conflict is a direct, open one or a more hidden structural one (the latter referred to as a contradiction). Nor should it be assumed that the purpose of the dialogue is to solve the conflict; it may also be to define it, crystallize it.
- 12) The present author spent six months 1954-1955 in a Norwegian prison as a conscientious objector, also doing work as participant observer in the prison community (see Fengselssamfunnet, Oslo, 1959). A stay in a prison is not intrinsically rewarding; many of the inmates not the persons one would easily choose for company given a free choice. But any social scientist will feel the fascination linked to a growing understanding of any form of social organization intrinsically rewarding. Also, the life in another society, with another social logic is so definitely an enhancing experience when there is a built-in guarantee that the time horizon is limited. Few time horizons are so well defined as short prison sentences. In fact, a stay in prison for a defendable infraction of some law, i.e. a political crime, is not a bad way of understanding one's own society through extensive dialogues with others who have to reflect on it from the bottom.

- 13) I am indebted to Professor Suthy for this felicitous expression.
- 14) Thus, Oscar Lewis, The Children of Sanchez, Autobiography of a Mexican Family, New York, Vintage Books, 1963, is beautiful in the sense of giving the word, in the first person singular (there is an individualist bias here!) to the poor themselves, and in a very non-mediated way. Jesús Sánchez and the children, Manuel, Roberto, Consuelo, Marta come to life. But why not let them dialogue? And what follows in terms of action? Anything, nothing Oscar Lewis lets them stand out so that they count more than the social scientist, and that element should certainly be praised highly. It is oral anthropology as a democratic counterpart to the elitism of oral history and the privatization of oral psychotherapy; but it stops at the level of the depth interview as an outcome of participant observation.
- 15) For more details about conceptualization of modern societies in terms of bureaucracy-corporation-intelligentsia complexes, see Johan Galtung, "Global Goals, Global Processes and the Prospects for Human and Social Development", Geneva, 1979.
- 16) See Johan Galtung, "On the Rise of Intellectuals as a Class", Geneva, 1979.
- 17) Like the "New International Economic Order", NIEO, "dialogue" is a term that stands for a <u>family of approaches</u> with elements of action research, ethno-methodology, phenomenological, hermeneutical and structural approaches, etc. Given this richness, which it should have, definitions and so on will have to be open and flexible to accommodate the various elements in a dynamic manner.
- 18) "Another no less instructive example of the normative limits of mutuality may be found in the relationship between a genuine psychotherapist and his patient. If he is satisfied to "analyze" his patient - that is, to bring to light unconscious factors from his microcosm and to apply to a conscious project the energies that have been transformed by this emergence - he may successfully accomplish some repairs. At best, he may help a diffuse soul that is poor in structure to achieve at least some concentration and order. But he cannot absolve his true task, which is the regeneration of a stunted personal center. That can be brought off only by a man who grasps with the profound eve of a physician the buried, latent unity of the suffering soul, which can be done only if he enters as a partner into a person-to-person relationship, but never through the observation and investigation of an object. In order to promote coherently the liberation and actualization of this unit in a new situation in which the other person comes to terms with the world, the therapist, like the educator, must stand not only at his own pole of the bipolar relationship but also at the other pole, experiencing

the effects of his own actions".

From Martin Buber, <u>I</u> and <u>Thou</u>, tr. by Walter Kaufman, New York, Scribner's 1970, p. 179, from the Afterword.

- 19) In this there is an elitist aspect: the researcher is well taken care of, he/she appears in multiple fashions. But so do actually people in general: in direct dialogue with researchers, with researchers as resource persons, with themselves alone just as normal human beings. This is a very important aspect of the approach taken: generally, a research process presupposes the presence in one way or the other of a (certified) researcher. Here the idea is that the part of the process with the researcher present may be just the proverbial top of the iceberg.
- 20) These three are a truncated version of five phases of a political process in general, as explored in Johan Galtung, The True Worlds, The Free Press/Macmillan, New York 1980, Chapter 4.3.
- 21) This idea of focussing on the antagonism rather than the antagonist is very basic to the thinking and action of M.K. Gandhi e.g. as explored in Johan Galtung and Arne Naess, <u>Gandhi's politiske etikk</u>, Tanum, Oslo, 1955.
- 22) The action research tradition seems to be particularly strong in West Germany and in the Nordic countries probably because of the combination of a strong social science tradition, high level of political consciousness among the social scientists, and a relatively high respect for citizen actions. For a good discussion see Aktionsforschung: Balanceakt Ohne Netz, Frankfurt, Syndikat, 1979.
- 23) Thus, for a usual intellectual conference/meeting/workshop to attain this level, level I so to speak, is already something, given the tendencies of such encounters to degenerate into parallel monologues. If in addition there is some kind of organizational coherence and even action, if only at a modest level such as that of producing a joint book of proceedings, one might look at the totality as a full-fledged dialogue. Thus, the notion of dialogue should in no way be tied to political action with researchers descending on a village only; the concept should be kept open.
- 24) For some points linked to the presentation in this paper, see next section.
- 25) There is a biblical style about Buber:

"The basic word I-You can only be spoken with one's whole being."

"The basic word I-It can never ben spoken with one's whole being." (p. 54).

"When I confront a human being as my You and speak the basic word I-You to him, the he is no thing among things nor does he consist of things. He is no longer He or She, limited by other Hes or Shes, a dot in the world grid of Space and Time, nor a condition that can be experienced and described, a loose bundle of named qualities. Neighborless and seamless, he is You and fills the firmament. Not as if there were nothing but he; but everything else lives in his light" (p. 59).

- 26) In a direct conflict there is already a level of consciousness, but it may be subject to modifications. The problem is how to proceed to the next stages whether the dialogue comprises all parties or is an intra-party dialogue only. In a structural conflict the conflict is built in the structure and an aspect of the conflict is precisely the lack of awareness, i.e. of being exploited. For this type of consciousness-raising, the intra-party rather than inter-party dialogue seems indispensable. But the concept of dialogue should be broad enough to encompass all the types mentioned here.
- 27) The tradition of small group research associated with such names as Bales and the Harvard tradition of the 1950s would seem to indicate that equal participation rates can only be obtained through a high level of restraint externally or internally imposed. The basic point would be to avoid zero participation of anyone rather than to aim for an abstract equality that does not reflect inter-human differences in dialogue interest and competence, not to mention the role-playing that will come about through internal differentiation.
- 28) The present author, while assistant professor in the Department of Sociology at Columbia University 1958-60, headed a research team in Charlottesville, VA., to study the crisis associated with desegregation. The idea was, as usual, to "get a book out of it", but also to contribute however little to the political struggle. Very soon it became clear that the priorities had to be reversed, partly because the amount and kind of information became so essential to the conflict itself that I was in a position to give concrete advice without giving away information volunteered by the many "respondents" (At that time this terminology was still used). Result: Many grateful citizens and no publication not a bad outcome of a research process although I myself had a very limited understanding of that at that time.

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- 29. It should be remembered that the <u>dia</u> in the word <u>dialogue</u> does not stand for "two", but for "through"; adding up to something like "conversation" see Solomon Marcus, "A Dialogue about Dialogue", Paper presented for the Second Planning Meeting of the GPID-project, Geneva, January 1978, p. 1. Thus, there is no need to make use of terms like "multilogue".
- 30. It may be discussed what is worse, the expert who dominates or the expert who pretends being a non-expert, "I'm only here to learn". The former may be a bore, but at least honest, the second may be unobtrusive but the dishonesty may have negative pay-offs. It is, for instance, highly compatible with the use of the other participants as producers of data raw material.
- 31. Thus, like in all discourse, reality has to be interpreted to be discussed, it has to be coded and decoded as is done in the Freire approach. However, the rules of coding and decoding should not be left to outside experts, that should itself be a subject of dialogues. See the paper by Miguel and Hilda Escobar in this volume.
- 32. This should not be confused with a group interview, where the social scientist is in a listening position see R.K. Merton et al., The Focussed Interview, The Free Press, 1959.
- 33. Thus, in Paolo Freire's famous approach the dialogue is tied to literacy programs combining educating people, particularly illiterates, while increasing their level of political consciousness. But the dialogue as such is of course a much broader approach, and also more open, with less of a pedagogical one-way Zielsetzung than Freire has. Freire is closer to Socrates than to dialogue as conceived of here, in the rightly famous Pedagogy of the Oppressed, New York, 1970.
- 34. I am particularly grateful to Patrick Healey for insisting on this point.
- 35. See Johan Galtung, An Inquiry into the Concepts of Reliability, into Subjectivity and Constancy, Papers on Methodology, Ejlers, Copenhagen, 1978; Chapter 3.
- 36. Dialogue theme formulations of Coals, Processes and Indicators of Development
- 37. Anisur Rahman, currently working with the ILO in Geneva, a beautiful write up of "A Dialogue with Bhoomi Sena", Geneva, 1977, on highly sensitive political matter.
- For an exploration of these terms, see Johan Galtung, "The Social Sciences: An Essay on Polarization and Integration", Papers on Methodology, Ejlers, Copenhagen, 1978; Chapter 1.
- Although not in a statistical sense, in the sense of making it possible to compute averages and so on, however meaningless or meaningful they may be the dialogue method can be representative in another sense. It can be based on a maximum of diversity, getting groups from various layers of the social structure and parts of the social geography. In doing so a highly diversified picture can be given of any country or community for that matter, again an example of how the dialogue method may tend to give more pluralistic, more locally specific and diverse images than the survey method would do.

- 40. This, however, is also a problem with the survey method: there is at present no consensus about the method to be used in order to aggregate data from one level of analysis to the other. A country is not the same as the set of inhabitants.
- 41. One idea is to make use of GPID for this purpose, as a medium.
- 42. One possibility is to eliminate such people from the beginning so that they do not participate in the dialogues; another one is what the teacher would usually do: to ask the talkative one to shut up and to encourage the less talkative.
- 43. One reason why the other side might prefer this role is simply lack of curiosity or interest in the social scientist, either as a person or in what he represents. The present author had strongly that feeling when visiting China: there was some kind of dialogue, but it was always I asking them about China and then we discussed that; rarely they asking me about my fields of experiences.
- 44. See Johan Galtung, "An Essay on Intellectual Styles", GPID Geneva, 1980, note 9 above.
- 45. For a discussion of this, see Johan Galtung, "On the Utopian Betrayal", "On Alpha and Beta and their many Combinations", Eleonora Masini ed., Visions of Desirable Societies, Pergamon 1980, ch.1.
- 46. This, of course, is the same as the process that has been taking place in the United Nations recently: when Third world countries no longer play the western game it is referred to as "politicization".
- 47. The GPID-project should have this type of ambition: an effort to link up people in periphery communities with each other, through the medium of the social scientists.
- 48. This refers to the <u>public</u> nature of science; it is not a private revelation. Dialogue has both sides to it. What is written up or acted out should be challengeable; but the essence of the dialogical experience is deeply private and can never be entirely a part of the public domain. Konrad Lubbert in <u>SERVAS International News</u>, Sept.1976, expresses it very well:

 "Dialogue happens when I personally feel touched, when I feel challenged as a person, when a new dimension or insight might be opened. sometimes suddenly we feel we are totally involved. After this kind of dialogue we discover that we ourselves have changed a bit. Of course, this kind of changing, of deep and challenging dialogue, is seldom, but this is the aim, the purpose and hope involved in every dialogue. In dialogue I try to understand the standpoint of the other, to make my own opinion reasonable to him."
- 49. And this practice is most likely to develop at the local level, in smaller settings, not at the national level where a dialogue is more likely to be co-opted. See George Kent's section on "Development Planning Through Dialogue" in his Community-based Development Planning, University of Hawaii, Dept. of Political Science,1979: "The natural method of development planning among ordinary people is dialogue. "This type of spirit should be compared with the typical highly non-dialogical approach expressed in the World Bank's REPORT(in an article on family planning, January 1978): "The process of persuading the impoverished small farmer or landless worker to limit his family is likely to be a protracted one at best, and the chances of success cannot be rated very high. "True. But the alternative given is not a dialogue (where the farmer can ask why the planner is not limiting his family more, given all the resources powerful people consume), but "- the main contact of the family planning program of the poor has been in the context of the mass sterilization camps that have taken place for a limited time outside the village setting."

BOOK VII

The simile of the cave is the climax of Plato's discussion of philosophy. It is a brilliant example of his ability to create myth out of abstract ideas and is, as well, a major statement of his thought. The escape from the cave and into the sunlight represents the progress of the soul from the prison house of the senses to the world of true reality. The philosopher-kings, who will make possible the establishment of the ideal state, are to be not only seasoned men of action in the world of government but also saints who have achieved a religious vision of the supreme good.

AND NOW, I said, let me show in a figure how far our nature is enlightened or unenlightened:—Behold! human beings living in an underground den, which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all along the den; here they have been from their childhood, and have

their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can only see before them, being prevented by the chains from turning

round their heads. Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionette players have in front of them, over which they show the puppets.

And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall carrying all sorts of vessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and various materials, which appear over the wall? Some of them are talking, others silent.

You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.

Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows, or the shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave?

the low wall, and the moving figures of which the shadows are seen on the opposite wall of the den.

True, he said; how could they see any- of the denthing but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads?

And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only see the shadows?

Yes, he said.

And if they were able to converse with one another, would they not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them?

Very true.

And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other side, would they not be sure to fancy when one of the passers-by spoke that the voice which they heard came from the passing shadow?

The prisoners would mistake the shadows for realities.

No question, he replied.

To them, I said, the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the images.

× That is certain.

And now look again, and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners are released and disabused of their error. At first, when any of them is liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and walk and look towards the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the shadows; and then conceive some one saying to him, that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now, when he is approach-

ing nearer to being and his eye is turned towards more real existence, he has a clearer vision,—what will be his reply? And you may further imagine that his instructor

is pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them,—will he not be perplexed? Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him?

And when released, they would still persist in maintaining the superior truth of the shadows.

Far truer.

And if he is compelled to look straight at the light, will he not have a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take refuge in the objects of vision which he can see, and which he will conceive to be in reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him?

True, he said.

And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged ascent, and held fast until he is forced into the presence of the sun himself, is he not likely to

When dragged upwards, they would be dazzled by excess of light.

be pained and irritated? When he approaches the light his eyes will be dazzled, and he will not be able to see anything at all of what are now called realities.

Not all in a moment, he said.

He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper world. And first he will see the shadows best, next the reflections of men and other objects in the water, and then the objects themselves; then he will gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heaven;

prisoners: the

tance:

light at a dis-